Auditing the Contracts

A practical map for security researchers auditing the oddszero Move package. Where to look, what to verify, and known historical fixes baked into the code.

File-by-file audit checklist

File	What to verify
prediction_market.move	compute_buy/compute_sell fee math; buy_shares closing-only gate; redeem_shares parimutuel pro-rata payout; finalize_resolution seed refund + outcome constraints; reclaim_abandoned_seed 30-day gate + idempotency; dispute settlement loop.
amm_pool.move	buy_cost/sell_return quadratic root & overflow guards; apply_buy/apply_sell underflow cases (favorite buy); add_liquidity/remove_liquidity collateral vs min_reserve basis.
share_token.move	apply_buy/apply_sell mirror pool; burn_winning only post-resolution; the documented note that a ledger-only invariant check would falsely abort.
coin_wrapper.move	deposit/withdraw balance checks; no way to inflate value.
oracle_integration.move	propose timing; raise_dispute bond & MAX_DISPUTES; finalize consensus binding; split_bond/drain_bond balance safety.
admin.move	is_admin/is_oracle checks; AdminCap non-copyable/non-drop.
governance.move	set_param admin check; vote weight bound; apply_param bounds; proposal quorum/threshold; price_closing_only_window_ms / max_settlement_delay_ms params.
treasury.move	withdraw admin + balance check; fee routing.
lp_incentives.move	index accrual; claim vault-balance bound; underfunded remainder handling.
price_oracle.move	derive_outcome feed/freshness/confidence checks; reference_price baseline; verified_reading on-chain Pyth attestation; push_threshold_bps tie handling.
order_book.move	cancel_order unfilled-only refund; fill_pair escrow move; crosses price-time.
errors.move	stable codes 1–34; no reuse.
utils.move	safe_* / mul_div overflow/divide-by-zero.

Historical fixes to confirm are present

These are concrete bugs the code comments reference as fixed — verify they remain fixed:

1. Unbacked governance voting — governance::vote previously accepted arbitrary weight. Now requires a held GovernanceShare with weight ≤ share.amount ≤ gov_share_supply.
2. Cap-only param changes — governance::set_param previously checked only AdminCap possession. Now assert_admin checks the registered admin address.
3. Phantom complete-set minting (1:1 redemption bug) — trades previously could mint a phantom complete set, breaking redemption. Now apply_buy/apply_sell mirror the pool reserves and the trader's own shares are tracked in Position, with no phantom set.
4. LP factor-n bias — liquidity math previously used total_reserves (n× collateral), draining LPs. Now uses real collateral with min(collateral, min_reserve) basis.
5. Corrupt-oracle + colluder-dispute — a regular oracle could honor a single dispute to lock a false outcome. Now disputed markets escalate to admin, with bounded outcome choice.
6. Unread min_resolution_delay_ms — resolution previously ignored it. Now enforced in resolve_market.
7. Frontend :443 / dead fullnode — constants.ts normalizes malformed GraphQL/fullnode URLs so balance reads never silently break.

Invariant test ideas

• Buy then sell the same amount near 1:1 → vault should net ~fee only.
• Mint a complete set via add_liquidity then remove_liquidity → value-neutral round trip (no factor-n loss).
• After resolution, sum of winning shares across users × pool / total_winning_shares == win_refund_pool (parimutuel payout cap).
• Seed refund: after finalize_resolution, creator's seed_vault is 0 and creator received full 10,000.
• Push market: both Up and Down holders receive pro-rata payout from push_refund_pool.
• Raise disputes with conflicting claims → admin finalize constrained; bonds settled correctly.
• Attempt redeem_shares twice → second aborts with EAlreadyRedeemed.
• Price market with a stale/wide-confidence reading → derive_outcome aborts.
• reclaim_abandoned_seed after 30 days → seed refunded, residual swept, market marked ABANDONED. Calling again is a no-op.

Fuzzing surface

Entry points take user-controlled payment, outcome, shares, min_shares, bond, price_bps, claimed_outcome. Boundary conditions to fuzz: outcome == n, shares == 0, payment so small set rounds to 0, now exactly at dispute_deadline, bond just below required_bond, lp_shares exceeding supply.

Tools

• sui move test with --coverage to confirm branch coverage of guards.
• sui move lint for Move lint warnings.
• Manual review of errors::all_codes() for completeness vs. assert! sites.